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Surrogate warfare: the art of war in the 
21st Century? 
Airpower, drones and cyber-weapons are employed by states in conjunction with local armed non-
state actors in an effort to coercively intervene in the crises of the 21st century. While the 
externalization of the burden of warfare is a return to pre-modern war, it is the change in the 
underlying socio-political relations between the state and its military agent that is a novel 
phenomenon in surrogate warfare. This article demonstrates that in a post-Westphalian era 
characterized by non-state violence, globalized conflicts, a prioritization of risk management in a 
mediatized environment, the state has to explore new ways to remain relevant as the primary 
communal security provider. Thereby, the organization of violence has departed from the 
employment of the state’s soldier as the primary bearer of the burden of warfare to a mode of war 
where technological and human surrogates enable the state to manage the risks of post-modern 
conflict remotely. In this article, we conceptually explore surrogate warfare as a socio-political 
phenomenon within the context of globalized, privatized, securitized and mediatized war.  
Introduction 
The debate about the changing character of war is more than two decades old. While initially the 
‘new wars’ were often merely characterized against the backdrop of the fading dynamics of the 
Cold War, throughout the 1990s and 2000s the debate about these allegedly new wars became 
more nuanced looking at a variety of different features shaping post-modern conflict. The entire 
socio-political and geo-strategic context in which warfare in the 21st century is conducted, is 
fundamentally different from the purely Westphalian, Clausewitzian ideas of warfare that were 
prevalent in the late 18th, 19th and 20th century. This article deals with the issue of the changing 
nature of war from a socio-political point of view, suggesting that surrogate warfare as the 
prevalent mode of war in the 21st century helps the state to deal with the demands put upon it 
when providing national security in the complex globalized context of the new millennium.   
The War on the ‘Islamic State’ (ISIS) exemplifies how the approach to warfare has changed in the 
new millennium not just in the Western World but also in the Arab World. The hybridity with 
which ISIS operates – locally as an insurgency movement and in Europe as a terrorist organization 
– the asymmetry of power between Al Baghdadi’s Mujahedeen and the diverse anti-ISIS coalition, 
and the various ways and means states employ fight the extremists, are indicators of a new era 
of warfare. First, the fight against ISIS is a globalized war. It requires counterterrorist operatives 
and counterinsurgents to cooperate in a transnational, multi-dimensional battlespace where 
armed forces and law enforcement operate across borders to tackle geographically contrapuntal 
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threats. Second, the War on the ‘Islamic State’ is one that is widely privatized, namely where the 
boundaries between state and non-state authority are increasingly blurry. ISIS as a pseudo-state 
entity is confronted by state and non-state actors who provide security to communities 
supplementing or substituting state authority. Third, the jihadist peril is a risk that is subjectively 
securitized. The mujahedeen in the waning self-proclaimed caliphate are as much part of the 
intangible threat environment as homegrown terrorists in the suburbs of Europe’s cities are. 
Fourth, fighting ISIS is a battle on narratives as well as one using kinetics. In the 21st century where 
war is a spectacle broadcasted live via social media, victories are no longer just won on the 
physical battlefield but also in the cyberspace and in the information sphere. A subjective, 
ideologically-shaped perception of victory can sometimes overcome an actual military defeat on 
the battlefield.  
It is within this context that the state is trying to remain relevant as the communal security 
provider. Communal security here refers to the security of the community the state presides over. 
The state, which developed into the monopolist on violence during the 19th century, needs to 
justify its existence by delivering on people’s security needs. It has to do so in a globalized context, 
opposed and undermined by non-state actors, in a climate of risks that are too intangible to 
pinpoint but potentially too severe to ignore, and on the radar of a global public sphere capable 
of turning battlefield victories into strategic defeats. This article argues that considering the 
demands put upon the state in the 21st century, the state is increasingly looking to externalize the 
burden of warfare to human and technological surrogates. As this article will show surrogate 
warfare allows the state to manage the increasing portfolio of risks globally while minimizing its 
exposure to human, financial and reputational costs, and thereby ultimately political risks. 
Although the motivations for the supplementation or substitution of the state’s own statutory 
forces differ, great powers, small powers, liberal and authoritarian regimes increasingly engage in 
warfare by surrogate in the 21st century.  
This article commences by conceptualizing warfare by surrogate as a socio-political phenomenon 
transforming the way states deal with the risks and uncertainties of the world in the 21st century 
before explaining the geo-strategic context in which the concept has to be read. It continues by 
outlining the motivations for why states have resorted to the use of surrogates in the wars of the 
new millennium. In the conclusion, the article will briefly touch upon the consequences of 
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surrogate warfare for conflict and conflict resolution questioning whether it can be a panacea for 
dealing with the complexities of 21st century warfare. 
The Concept of Warfare by Surrogate  
Fighting a war by surrogate is a concept that lies at the intersection of the debates around proxy 
and compound warfare (Huber, 2002). Yet, it is neither one nor the other. Surrogate warfare 
exceeds the boundaries of the strategic debate about proxy warfare that emerged in the Cold 
War, while also going beyond the too operational debate on Huber’s concept of compound 
warfare. The reason is that the means of substituting or externalizing the burden of warfare for 
taxpayers, policy makers and the military, have become a lot more diverse in the information and 
automation age, allowing patrons to explore new routes to minimize their own burden of war 
while still achieving their objectives.  
Etymologically, the term ‘surrogate’ comes from the Latin verb surrogare meaning ‘to elect as a 
substitute’, thereby entailing the aspect of proxy, replacement and supplement (Oxford 
Dictionary, 2017). .On the fringes of the Special Forces literature a conceptualization has emerged, 
which albeit insufficiently contextualized, comes closes to the concept as understood in this 
article. As Smith writes  
“A surrogate, in its simplest sense, takes the place of something or someone. The 
surrogate is also a proxy for a particular function or set of functions. The word surrogate 
is not meant to be pejorative, but rather an expression that conveys substitution of one 
for another. Generally, it implies that the surrogate is acting on behalf of the interests of 
another and is in some way distinct from the source of its authority to act” (Smith, 2009, 
p.40) 
We define surrogate warfare as the conceptual umbrella for all forms of externalization of the 
burden of warfare to supplementary as well as substitutionary forces and platforms. The concept 
applies to the activator-proxy relationship of the 20th century concept of proxy warfare, as well as 
to the purely operational, niche concept of surrogate warfare as developed by Smith (2009). 
Unlike the literature that looks at different forms of deputation of war from a historic or 
operational point of view, we approach the concept more holistically and conceptually as a socio-
political phenomenon. We see the externalization of the burden of warfare as a socio-political 
4 | P a g e  
 
transformation in the nature of war, whereby the state in the 21st century is exploring non-
trinitarian ways and means to deal with the contemporary risks and uncertainties we outline in 
the next section. It constitutes a break from the classical, trinitarian model of war where the state 
employs the citizen soldier to generate security as a public good exclusively for society as a 
discretionary association.  
Amid the globalization and transnationalization of conflict, the privatization of security and the 
resulting intangibility of threat, the state has discovered surrogate warfare as a means to 
externalize, partially or wholly, the strategic, operational and tactical burden of warfare to a 
human or technological surrogate with the principal intent of minimizing the burden of warfare 
for its own taxpayers, soldiers and ultimately its policymakers (Krieg, 2016a, p.99). Surrogates can 
be human or technological platforms. Human surrogates can be terrorist organizations, 
insurgency groups, transnational movements, mercenaries or private military and security 
companies. As a technological platform, the surrogate can be an unmanned air power or space 
power weapon enabling the patron to wage war by means more effective, economical or 
clandestine than the conventional infantry force. The cyber domain which brings states, non-state 
actors and individuals together, is particularly favourable for waging warfare by surrogate as 
attribution is almost impossible. The patron-surrogate relationship can be intentional and 
unintentional. Cooperation, coordination or force integration can be direct, indirect or 
coincidental. Human surrogates can employ regular, irregular or hybrid means of warfare, 
providing the patron with a range of core and niche capabilities. In that way, a surrogate can be 
any agent allowing the patron to externalize the burden of warfare, mostly through deputizing for 
his own ground forces. A surrogate does not necessarily substitute for the entire military 
capability of the patron, as the conventional proxy does, but may at times merely supplement 
existing capability. 
The idea of using surrogates to externalize the burden of war is not revolutionary in itself. Since 
Ancient times, empires and states have entrusted auxiliaries, substitutes and proxies, at least 
partially, with the execution of military functions on their behalf. As much as irregular, asymmetric 
or unconventional warfare have been part of the norm in the history of warfare, so have 
surrogates (Mumford, 2013, p.1). Romans employed ‘barbarian’ tribes to multiply their forces, 
relying on their local knowledge and relations with local populations; the most famous example 
is that of Arminius, the German chieftain who supplied the Romans with tribal support in the 
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inaccessible terrains east of the Rhine (Lacey, 2012). The wealthy Renaissance city-states of 
northern Italy employed the condottieri—commercial armed contractors—to protect their wealth 
from greedy neighbours (Singer, 2003, p.22). In the American Revolution, the British Army 
multiplied its forces by using 35,000 Hessian mercenaries to fight the hybrid threat of 
Washington’s continental army and colonial militias (Atwood, 1980). Wellington owed his success 
in the Peninsular War against Napoleon’s Grande Armée to the support of the Spanish guerrillas 
attacking the French occupier’s lines of communication (Boot, 2013, p.82). The relatively small 
island nation of Britain was able to rule more than a quarter of the world only by relying on 
colonial surrogates: twelve political officers, 100 British soldiers and 800 paramilitary surrogates 
could control 10 million people (Ferris, 2012, p.201). In the early stages of the Second World War, 
when Britain was far from ready to engage the Nazi threat directly, Churchill envisaged employing 
continental resistance movements as surrogates to attack the Wehrmacht from the rear 
(Mansoor, 2012, p.4). During the Cold War, with the growing need for deniability, the 
superpowers often resorted to the use of surrogates to achieve strategic objectives overseas, the 
Soviet support for the Vietcong in Vietnam and the US support for the mujahideen in Afghanistan 
being the most famous examples. 
Although not a novel concept, contemporary surrogate warfare has become the norm rather than 
the exception in the state’s management of violence in recent decades. It is here where surrogate 
warfare constitutes a break from the past: it helps the state as a trinitarian actor to remain the 
primary communal security provider in a globalized, privatized, securitized and mediatized world. 
Competing with non-state actors, the state desperately tries to hold on to its role as the primus 
in pares in a neo-medieval global system where the primary benefactors of war might not be the 
nation at home but communities elsewhere. Unwilling to bear the burden of post-modern war, 
the aversion to war that societies at home, particularly in the Western world display, confront the 
state with a delicate dilemma: protecting society from ever more risks while minimizing direct 
military commitments overseas in doing so.  
Here, the concept of burden of war is central to the understanding of surrogate warfare. The 
burden of war has not been a defined, static variable. On the contrary, the burden of war is a 
concept that has changed throughout history. Traditionally the burden of war referred to the 
human and financial costs incurred by the belligerents. Since these costs used to be borne by 
aristocratic leaders waging war using their own funds to pay for both equipment and warriors, 
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civilians were only directly affected when they actually got caught in the crossfire. As wars 
developed into people’s wars in the 18th century and hostilities were no longer just confined to 
distant battlefields but increasingly moved into the public space, the financial and human burden 
of war was increasingly carried by society as well. Throughout the 20th century the levée en masse 
ideologically underpinned by social-Darwinist nationalism and reinforced by the technological 
advancement of the Industrial Revolution created the preconditions for total war and with it total 
sacrifice. The burden of war had become all-encompassing.   
People’s wars, as conceptualized by Prussian military theorists such as Moltke in the 19th century 
(Förster, 1987, p.210), brought with it another cost for governments. Irrespective of the socio-
political system, introducing the populace to the warfare equation, meant that governments now 
had to justify and legitimize human and financial costs before the people when going to war. By 
the mid-20th century the idea of the total war consuming all of society’s resources had become 
less attractive; both due to the devastating experience of World War II and due to the realistic 
prospect of a nuclear apocalypse during the Cold War. At the same time, media had created a 
public arena of political scrutiny, where governments suddenly had to defend the expenditures in 
the nation’s blood and money before their people. The decision to resort to war evolved into a 
subjective cost-benefit analysis whereby the sometimes intangible benefits of military action are 
weighed against the expected costs (Mandel, 2004, p.25). The globalized wars of the late 20th and 
early 21st century as well as the increasing transparency of international affairs have thereby 
created a new political burden of war that is borne by policy makers. With a public antagonism 
and antipathy towards conflict and organized violence, policy makers are now forced to manage 
the political costs of armed conflict as the post-modern burden of war. That is to say, the risks 
arising from soldier casualties, constant wars with limited obvious benefits for society at home, 
and the direct armed intervention into supposedly sovereign states, are incurred by the state as 
an authority under international, domestic and local scrutiny. This post-modern burden of war is 
thereby not an exclusive phenomenon to liberal states but can be observed in non-liberal states 
as well. Russia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have all distinct motivations to externalize 
the burden of war for reasons of discretion and deniability as will be demonstrated further below.  
And this is where surrogate warfare appears as a panacea for the state in the 21st century. By 
externalizing the burden of warfare, the state is able to dissociate itself from organized violence 
executed under its direction by surrogates. Apart from minimizing the financial and human costs 
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of war, the state can also avoid bearing the political costs of warfare. The surrogate as an extra-
trinitarian agent has no direct ties to society at home but operates in relative autonomy from the 
human input of the patron’s society. It is a non-trinitarian mode of warfare that allows states and 
non-state actors to manage risks globally and contain threats without having to rely on their 
people as the principal trinitarian actor to provide for it.  
Surrogate warfare cuts the socio-political ties between society, state and soldier allowing the 
state to replace the soldier as the executive agent from the midst of society with an external 
agent. The only link the surrogate maintains to the patron is through the body that either pays, 
trains or directs it or him. In so doing, surrogate warfare is a return to warfare amid the socio-
political realities of the pre-1792 years where the Kabbinetskriege or cabinet wars, were waged 
by the aristocracy and their cabinets for their own private interests. The cabinet wars of the 
medieval and early modern ages “had been conducted in order to secure dynastic interests, and 
had been fought with the aid of mercenary armies, led by aristocratic officers, largely to the 
exclusion of the civilian population” (Förster, 1987, p.210). Surrogate warfare in the 21st century 
witnesses a return to these pre-modern practices in the management and application of violence 
with executive action enabling the state to protect less than existential national interests 
(Johnson, 1987, p.210). It allows wars to be fought in the shadows, off the global and domestic 
public radar. 
In a transnational security complex where a spectrum of global actors are connected by the 
mutuality of threats and risks as well as their fear from each other, security has become a global 
public good with beneficiaries who more often than not, are external to the trinitarian constructs 
that provide for it. That is to say that in the absence of a world government as a global authority, 
the security of the global community lies in the hands of individual states as the only legitimate 
rights holder and security provider in the current state-centric international law system. Yet, the 
state’s social contractarian set-up provides the state’s authority with the dilemma of having to 
provide security as a potentially global good, i.e. beyond its boundaries, through a mechanism 
created to provide security as a discretionary, public good (Krieg, 2016c). The state as the 
sovereign entrusted with the provision of public security defined in terms of national security, has 
to engage threats that are less tangible emanating from transnational actors who increasingly 
pose a threat to communities far away and only secondly to society at home. 
8 | P a g e  
 
Thus, with warfare being less trinitarian both in respect to who fights these wars and who is the 
principal benefactor, the public security complex of the trinity of community, sovereign and 
security provider becomes increasingly challenged – internally and externally. Internally, the 
community exercises scrutiny over the treasure and blood being spent by the sovereign to provide 
security primarily for community outsiders. Externally it is the international community that holds 
the sovereign accountable for its employment of coercive means in out-of-area operations. 
Finally, also local communities in the conflict theatre critically examine how the external patron 
intends to provide security overseas. What emerges is a complex construct of internal and 
external push and pull factors that drive the state to externalize the burden of warfare to 
surrogates. The trinitarian relationship between community, authority and security provider, 
conventionally defined by society, state and soldier, expands to a patron-surrogate relationship 
with minimal internal or external scrutiny (see figure 1). 
In essence, surrogate warfare provides the ideal means for states to fulfil its security function and 
thereby stay relevant in an apolar, globalized world where the global distribution of power makes 
it challenging for any one single actor to become a world hegemon. The externalization of the 
burden of warfare goes beyond the Clausewitzian conceptualization of war as a trinitarian activity 
(Clausewitz, 1832, p.28). States enter into complex security assemblages that re-define the socio-
political nature of war (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2010, p.91). For example, in the fight against 
ISIS, Western states use remote controlled weapon systems to support human surrogates who 
provide local communal security half way around the world in the Middle East. What emerges are 
Figure 1 
Societ
y 
Soldier 
State Surrogate 
Global Public Opinion 
Local Public Opinion 
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assemblages of external state actors employing technological platforms to remotely support their 
local human surrogates who primarily serve local interests – all that to mitigate potential future 
risks that might emerge from an organization such as ISIS left uncontained.  
The Context of Surrogate Warfare   
When writing about the changing nature of warfare, scholars, analysts and military professionals 
tend to compare organized violence in the 21st century to the classical metaphysics of war as 
defined in the post-French Revolutionary era by the likes of Clausewitz. Thereby, classical warfare 
in itself, i.e. state on state war fuelled by patriotic, nationalist ideology mobilizing entire societies 
to fight for survival, is a historic anomaly. Nonetheless, in the literature classical warfare remains 
the point of reference to define the changes in the strategic and operational context in which 
organized violence is planned and executed since the end of the Cold War. In essence, it is the 
non-trinitarian character of post-modern war that sets it apart from the Clausewitzian ideal of the 
classical trinitarian war. Clausewitz frames war as an interplay of the socio-political relationships 
between society, state and soldier: society as the principal assigns the state with a duty to protect 
communal interests, the state in turn raises the soldier from among the midst of society as its 
executive agent to protect the trinity (Clausewitz, 1940, p.89). Security as a public good is confined 
in its scope to the boundaries of the state and the public sphere of society that brings the 
particular state into existence. This trinitarian idea of security as a public good and the consequent 
division of power in the management of organized violence appears to be increasingly far from 
the norm in the 21st century where interstate wars for national survival have become more the 
exception than the norm (Holmqvist, 2005, pp.77-138). 
At the beginning of the 1990s Van Creveld predicted that by the end of the 2nd millennium the 
state would no longer be in a position to determine the outcomes of conflicts. While state 
authority is increasingly undermined by non-state actors and states increasingly refrain from 
major combat operations, the level of transnational violence is on the rise (Van Creveld, 1991, 
p.192; Realuyo, 2015). In addition to the decline of the state as the main protagonist in war, Van 
Creveld argued that the clear division of labour within Clausewitz’s trinitarian war, i.e. between 
the government that wages and directs war, the soldier that fights and dies, and the people who 
pay and suffer, was no longer apparent (Van Creveld, 2002, p.8). Thus, according to Van Creveld, 
violence in the 21st century had become a non-trinitarian undertaking. Following Van Creveld’s 
deconstruction of war, Mary Kaldor coined the term New Wars to illustrate the fact that modern 
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wars are first, fought by a combination of state and non-state actors; second, rely on identity 
politics to achieve political rather than physical control of populations through fear and terror; 
and third, are financed through predatory and illicit means (Kaldor, 1999). These non-trinitarian 
wars in the post-modern era have four recurring attributes: they are globalized, privatized, 
securitized and mediatized.  
Globalized War 
The world at the beginning of the 21st century is shaped by the digital revolution allowing for the 
rapid exchange of data and ideas; by the transportation revolution increasing the transnational 
mobility of individuals and communities; by the organizational revolution redirecting the flow of 
authority; influence and power, the economic revolution enhancing the global flow of goods, 
services and capital (Rosenau, 1999); and finally by an exponential rate of technological progress, 
involving increasing computing power, big data generation and the fusion of physical, digital, 
cognitive and biological science which have the potential to create a Fourth Industrial Revolution 
(4IR) (Schwab, 2016; see also Rickli 2017a, 2017b). The latter has consolidated the dynamics of 
globalization increasing the interconnectedness of people and communities as well as conflicts 
and threats. Socio-political and intercultural affairs and exchange have merged into transnational 
flows that can no longer be contained by individual states or state authorities. The resulting state 
of uncertainty has often been referred to as anarchical in absence of state regulation. Bull points 
already in 1977 to a neo-medievalization of the world, a quasi-return to the pre-Westphalian era 
(Bull, 2012). From the point of view of the 2000s with its 9/11 attacks and the spread of global 
jihadism, massive transnational migration streams, the financial crisis of 2008 and the widespread 
collapse of state authority across Africa and the Middle East, the classical era of the 19th and 20th 
century appears in the far distance of history. The institutions, organizations, authorities and 
values that we have come to cherish have been somewhat undermined. Units of analysis such as 
‘national’ and ‘international’ are being complemented by categories of ‘transnationality’ so as to 
be able to describe the sphere that affects individuals both within and outside the boundaries of 
the state and the nation – two concepts that have equally lost their strategic significance in the 
disintegrating order of the 21st century. Paradoxically, the loss of significance of these two 
concepts, has contributed to the recent successes of populist movements across the globe who 
exploit popular fears of communal identity loss. This phenomenon is supported, and has been 
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enabled, by the digitalisation of socio-political affairs, which is characterised by the ubiquity of 
the spread and the global reach of ideas (Rickli, 2007).  
These dynamics reshuffled the global system. While the state retains in law the full authority to 
regulate and manage global affairs, its authority is in practice challenged by non-state actors 
operating in the global transnational system. In this new apolar system, just like the one of 
medieval times, no one actor can dominate this increasingly anarchic environment across all 
dimensions of power (Haass, 2008). Anarchy in this context exceeds the conceptual boundaries 
of the Realist or Neo-realist idea of international anarchy. The anarchical apolarity in the 21st 
century is far less than just a leaderless state-centric construct; it is a competitive system of 
transnational nature that is no longer shaped exclusively by territorial integrity and state 
sovereignty, but by a dynamic interaction between state and non-state authorities across and 
beyond the boundaries of states.  
As a consequence, state-centrism, the premise on basis of which socio-politics and ultimately war 
have been conceptualized, is in a process of evolution and change. The idea that individuals and 
communities can only escape the state of nature through a social contractarian covenant binding 
them to an enforcement authority modelled on the post-Westphalian nation-state, has become 
increasingly challenging in a world of porous borders and growing migrant populations. Thus, war 
in the 21st century, which is concerned with the delivery of security as a global or transnational 
public good, might no longer exclusively be provided by the nation state for its citizens but by 
alternative socio-political enforcement authorities. 
Privatized War 
Non-trinitarian war has thereby been impacted by a privatization of security, namely the delivery 
and maintenance of security by non-state actors of whom many are either exclusively private or 
transnational in their orientation. The privatization of security is both bottom-up and top-down, 
whereby the latter occurred against the backdrop of the former. Top-down privatization of 
security has to be understood within the context of the globalized world, where the Weberian 
notion of the state monopoly on violence has been challenged by non-state actors who have taken 
over functions that the state had previously internalized since the early 19th century (Thomson, 
1996, p.10). The formation of transnational societies inhibiting an increasingly transnational 
political space affected by problems that call for transnational solutions, created the need for 
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former state-centric decision-making processes to develop into processes governed by supra-
state or non-state entities that increasingly rely upon private input (Leander, 2002, p.11). The 
state monopoly on violence has been exposed to a process of erosion in the developing world 
where the state is no longer capable of exercising this monopoly competing with warlords, war 
profiteers, organized crime, terrorists, rebels and paramilitary groups (Wulf, 2005).  
In the West in particular, the state itself has contributed to the privatization of war through the 
top-down commercialization of military and security services (Bislev, 2004, p.284). Amid the neo-
liberal wave of privatizing public goods under Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980s, the United States 
and Britain started to loosen the state’s monopoly on the delivery of public goods (Krieg, 2016b). 
In an effort to enhance effectiveness and efficiency, commercial enterprises were allowed to 
create a market for the management of violence. Unlike the ad hoc nature of mercenary bands 
operating in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, private military and security companies are 
hierarchically organized enterprises, which are registered locally and openly trade with their 
services, thereby driven by business profit rather than individual profit (Singer, 2003, p.46). 
Security has become a tradable commodity that is being sold to the highest bidder. Consequently, 
the state’s role in non-trinitarian war has often been that of a dispatcher, i.e. an authority 
delegating security functions to executive agents, which are not always inherent to the socio-
political milieu of the state. That is to say, the bonds between those providing security and those 
consuming it, though managed by the state, have been diffused – a circumstance that can be 
attributed to the new threat environment in the post-Cold War era and new approaches to 
securitization that came with it.  
Securitized War  
The post-modern threat environment after the Cold War has by no means become more 
manageable or predictable, but more intangible and uncertain. While throughout the 20th century 
wars were fought as zero-sum games for national interests that were often defined vis-à-vis a 
tangible and proclaimed referent object, the system finds it hard to do the same in the 21st 
century. The nemesis, the evil empire or the archenemy that had always been present on the 
horizon has dissolved into a blurry concept – a concept that at the least is not as visible or tangible 
anymore as it once was. In this environment where threats are less tangible and objectively hard 
to define, subjective securitization has been on the rise (Rasmussen, 2006).  
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The socio-political conceptualization of threat or securitization, underlying the legitimization of 
war in the 21st century, has most severely affected liberal states that seemed to be evermore 
entangled in wars that for their people are no longer recognizable as such. The global public 
sphere, which through social media has penetrated societal discourse in liberal and illiberal states 
alike, has exposed even the most remote communities to information and narratives that 
autocrats and liberal find hard to contain (Krieg, 2017, Chapter V). Therefore, as states, liberal and 
illiberal, have become increasingly accountable to their own populations, policy making has 
become far more scrutinized domestically and globally – something that elevates the 
precautionary principle to a major driver of policy making. It follows that states are particularly 
pressured to demonstrate to their public that they are doing something within a heterogeneous 
threat environment that ranges from global terrorism and insurgency, over state failure and 
financial crises to global warming and mass migration. The containment of these threats, at least 
in the developed world, remains the prerogative of the state even when acting supplemented by 
commercial actors and non-governmental organizations or as part of multinational coalitions. As 
threats emanate from localities far away, often simultaneously and within different domains, 
developed states feel the need to develop an ability to respond instantly across the globe – even 
when the required response might be of low intensity. Gregory calls these wars permanent 
‘everywhere wars’, characterized by geographically contrapuntal and protracted threats 
(Gregory, 2011, p.239). Threats need to be engaged before they evolve, sometimes even before 
they really exist. Hence, threats have given way to risks as the drivers of security policies in the 
‘global North’. Whereas the definition of threats requires a tangible other with plausible 
capabilities and communicated intentions, the definition of risks is more subjective as they refer 
to a probability of something disruptive happening in the future.  
The resulting securitization effort behind constructing these threats is something that Beck has 
defined as an integral effort of post-modern risk societies. Direct major wars between modern 
states have become somewhat unthinkable morally, financially and legally even as the West 
becomes more concerned about Russia’s surrogate interventions in Eastern Europe or about 
North Korea’s nuclear program. As the natural antagonist, traditionally another state power, has 
disappeared, threats in the modern sense of the word seize to exist spatially and temporally. 
Nonetheless, insecurity not security has become the norm in post-modern society (Coker, 2013, 
p.7). Beck argues that post-modern risk societies deal with this intangibility and unpredictability 
of threat by socially constructing threats on basis of risks. War as life in the post-modern society, 
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has become an exercise of risk construction, prevention and management (Beck, 2006, p.332). 
Within an environment of de-localized global risks, preventive diplomacy and the use of force at 
the global level have become a necessary evil of mitigating the political costs of omitting risks; 
namely it has become more socially acceptable to overreact to a potential risk than to underreact 
(Beck, 2006, p.335). The precautionary principle has indeed opened a Pandora’s Box of the 
“everywhere wars”. The consequences of trying to mitigate the unknown within a global sphere 
of uncertainty has confronted the state as the enforcement authority with an ironic reality where 
the lines between rationality and hysteria have become blurred. 
Mediatized War 
In an era where social media has revolutionized patterns of communication between and within 
communities across space and time, wars are broadcasted, subjective realities (Cottle, 2006, p.9 
ff.). Shaping the narrative of war has become a competitive effort between those intervening, 
those affected by intervention and third-party outsiders trying to influence public opinion globally 
and locally (Kaspersen and Rickli, 2016). Unlike internet 1.0, which provided a one-dimensional 
and one-directional flow of information from the platform to the consumer, internet 2.0 
facilitated by mobile devices provides a virtual platform of interactive discourse whereby content 
is being consumed and produced at the same time by both broadcasters and viewers (Andersen, 
2003, p.41). The exchange of information is instantaneous, multi-directional and interactive. The 
internet accessed through mobile devices has created a public cyberspace – a global public sphere 
characterized by Habermas’ principles of inclusive accessibility and interaction, which can hardly 
be controlled or sanctioned by any one state (Habermas, 1974, p.49-50). Information flows 
somewhat unrestrictedly across borders and when disseminated through social media, can be 
accessed anywhere, anytime by anyone. War is situated within this cyberspace – not just the 
operations themselves but most importantly the narratives of war that shape global public 
opinion. It is these narratives that often make the difference between an operational success on 
the battlefield and the strategic victory in a war as the defeat of Israel against Hezbollah in 2006 
demonstrated (Mayfield, 2011, p.80; see also Calwell et al, 2009, p. 6). States and the military are 
constantly on the public radar scrutinized locally, domestically and globally, increasing the 
potential political burden of war. It follows that influence and disinformation operations are 
becoming key instruments in the toolbox of state and non-state actors. In an age of ‘post-factual’ 
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socio-political discourse, the control of public opinion at home abroad and locally in theatre, 
becomes a vital centre of gravity (Davies, 2016). 
As a consequence of globalized, privatized, securitized and mediatized war, states seek solutions 
to stay relevant as the foremost authority to manage violence and protect communities. Societies 
at home demand ever higher levels of security while displaying an ever-growing aversion to war 
and casualties as communities’ expectations and attitudes towards war have changed (Mueller, 
1996, p.31; Smith, 2005, p. 500, Levy 2013). In an effort to create the illusion of bloodless wars 
that are being fought on battlefields far removed from the borders of one’s own homeland, liberal 
and illiberal states alike, have to reduce their direct military engagements overseas in terms of 
visibility, costs and accountability. States do not become less violent but have to find new ways 
and means to dissociate themselves from the management of violence. Fundamentally, states are 
looking towards new non-trinitarian means to fight wars, disrupting the classical bond between 
society and the state’s executive agent in war. The management of organized violence seems to 
be externalized to surrogates that would operate outside the conventional trinity, yet serving less 
than existential interests. Thereby, surrogate warfare appears as the natural response to the 
difficulties of managing risks, threats and conflicts in the 21st century in a global environment 
characterised by uncertainty and the ubiquity of information. 
The Motivations for 21st Century Surrogate Warfare 
In the globalized, privatized, securitized and mediatized security environment in which states 
operate in the 21st century, the motivations to externalize the burden of warfare are complex. A 
patron’s propensity to use surrogates depends on a variety of factors that for purely illustrative 
purposes can be put into a formula as follows: 
𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦 + (𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 − 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠) − 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
= 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑜 𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 
The most important aspect for the state is the social contractarian management of communal 
security. Therefore, for the state, the cost factor, which is comprised of the anticipated financial, 
human and political costs of the use of force, has to be weighed against the urgency of a crisis and 
the anticipated returns in terms of public security at home. The perception of urgency of a crisis 
through the broadened lens of risk and threat in the 21st century has been significantly diminished 
in comparison to security perceptions during the Cold War that were framed in reference to the 
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defence of vital national interests. In a globalized security context where security is more of a 
global public good rather than a public good, the urgency of a threat is no longer just a sum of 
realist considerations of vital national interests but, particularly in the West, can entail a reference 
to less tangible humanitarian interests. Surrogates provide particularly liberal states with a means 
to transfer or externalize the operational risks from the serviceman to the surrogate (Shaw, 2004, 
p.94) – thereby indirectly allowing the sovereign to externalize the political costs of war as well. 
Political costs refer here, to the costs for policy makers to commit to a crisis in face of public 
opinion, which can be both positive and negative, namely in support of intervention or strongly 
opposed to it. More often than not, however, public opinion, at least in Western democracies, 
appears to be unsupportive of military action (Smith, 2005). Therefore, public opinion is a factor 
related to costs rather than urgency.  
This is where the phenomenon of casualty aversion fits in as well – a phenomenon that though 
first observed in the Western world seems to be applicable to other non-Western states in the 
developed world as well. Within the trinity of community, sovereign and security provider, the 
community develops a close bond to the security provider, i.e. the serviceman whose raison d’être 
is primarily tied to the social contractarian duty of providing security as a public good for society 
at home. Deploying the serviceman as the trinitarian security provider of society and state 
overseas in crises that in the eyes of the public are not vitally urgent, decreases societal 
acceptance for casualties. For society, the life of a fellow citizen regardless of whether a soldier 
or a civilian, is rated higher than the life of a communal outsider. Society appears to be highly 
sensitive to the casualties suffered by its own soldiers, while remarkably insensitive to the deaths 
of outsiders, such as surrogate forces (Mandel, 2004, p.10). Even if society has an inclination to 
provide security as a global public good, the life of the soldier as a trinitarian actor, appears to 
always take precedence over the life of a stranger, even a non-combatant. As Mueller observes 
“When Americans asked themselves how many American lives it was worth to save hundreds of 
thousands of Somali lives, the answer came out rather close to zero” (Mueller, 1996, p.31). When 
the soldier as a public security provider, is assigned to out-of-area operations primarily benefitting 
the security interests of community outsiders, the community develops an aversion against the 
operational risk exposure of the soldier (Cook, 2004, p.69).  
Casualty aversion in liberal societies is a contested concept (Carruthers, 2014). Most analysts 
would agree, however, that the societal acceptance of casualties depends on a rather rational 
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cost-benefit analysis whereby the human costs of war are compared to the potential benefits an 
operation might generate for the nation (Larson, 1996, p.10). Moving beyond a narrow definition 
of benefits as merely vital national interests, the fact that the security perception in the 21st 
century has become more abstract often based on less tangible risks rather than concrete threats, 
causes communities to regard the deployment of servicemen overseas with a degree of suspicion 
(Levy, 2011, p.69). The more abstract the nature of securitization, e.g. the definition of threats 
and risks, the more difficult it becomes for the community to accept the human costs borne by 
the soldier as the trinitarian agent. The surrogate therefore provides the sovereign with a means 
to externalize these human and material costs to a substitute security provider. One of the most 
publicised patron-surrogate relations in recent years has been the United States’ delegation of 
warfighting to the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The Obama administration, 
eager to minimize the political costs of war in the Middle East to a minimum, while haunted by 
the prospect of a further radicalization of the Syrian Civil War, made a calculated decision to 
support its airpower campaign against jihadists with Syrian militias, trained and equipped by US 
Special Forces in theatre. Both presidents Obama and Trump, were able to wage war in northern 
Syria at minimal financial and human costs for the US military. Consequently, although covered 
by the mainstream media in the United States, America’s light-footprint intervention in Syria 
barely found its way into public debate (Humud, Blanchard, Nikitin, 2017). 
In this respect, the availability of technological platforms as potential substitutes for the human 
capacity in war can act as an intervening variable that might ease the patron’s decision to use 
force. The financial endowment of the patron plus the negative relationship between the patron’s 
disposal of human capacity and the patron’s disposal of technology constitutes the intervening 
variable of ‘capability’. The more capital-intense the patron’s policy-making, the readier the 
patron is to substitute capital for labour, namely use financial means to pay for human or 
technological surrogates. In particular, small states with relatively high financial endowments but 
small local human capacity such as the Arab Gulf States, have arguably a high propensity to use 
surrogates – both human and technological (Almezaini and Rickli, 2016). In the Arab Gulf States, 
loan servicemen from the developing world, most notably Northern Africa, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh have long constituted the backbone of local military capacity. More recently, private 
military companies have provided another form of surrogacy to the Gulf monarchies. The UAE’s 
heavy reliance on contractors in the Yemen War since 2015 is a case in point (Hager & Mazzeti 
2015; Sabi & Robertson, 2015). 
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Further, the state needs to manage its perception externally vis-à-vis the international 
community. Here the externalization of warfare to an extra-trinitarian surrogate can blur the 
direct lines of responsibility and accountability between the trinitarian security provider, the 
sovereign and the community. Particularly as military intervention has often a negative 
connotation in a state-centric international law system, surrogates can provide the patron with a 
degree of deniability (Shaw, 2005, p.88). The advent of the cyber domain in warfare has brought 
deniability to a new level and has thus increased the incentive to resort to covert operations to 
induce coercion. In times of transnational conflict involving a growing number of non-state actors 
waging war across borders, it has become increasingly easier for any actor to generate an effect 
on the ground without having to overtly deploy its own troops. Direct or indirect support for local 
forces in a conflict as surrogates can generate desired effects more covertly. The reliance of the 
Kremlin on private hacker communities and bots to disrupt the 2016 US Presidential Elections is 
one of the most recent examples of how a state can achieve disruptive effects covertly employing 
both human and technological surrogates (Lipton, Sanger & Shane, 2016). In the realm of kinetic 
warfare, Russia has also explored new avenues of employing contractors as surrogates who 
working for private military companies affiliated with the Kremlin, could be deployed to Ukraine 
in 2014 and Syria in 2015 with a degree of plausible deniability (Grove, 2015). In both cases Russia 
has generated a disruptive effect avoiding conclusive attribution.  
In Africa assemblages between state and non-state actors can take two forms. First, assemblages 
between patron and surrogate can take the form of externalizing expeditionary operations to 
surrogates who can operate covertly across borders without being attributed to the patron. The 
reliance of Liberia’s President Taylor on the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) as a surrogate in 
neighbouring Sierra Leone in the 1990s (Gberie, 2005, p.59) highlights this dynamic as much as 
Uganda’s support for the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC) in Congo (Autesserre, 2010, 
p.48). Second, assemblages in Africa between patron and surrogate can also be more benign as 
in the case of Tanzania where the central government indirectly provides security to local 
communities by externalizing the burden of security provision to mining companies hiring private 
military and security companies (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2017). Here, the motivations are not so 
much deniability as the lack of capacity and the need for local legitimacy.  
Finally, the externalization of the burden of warfare to surrogates allows patrons to manage their 
relationship with local communities in the theatre as the strategic and operational environment 
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in the 21st century becomes increasingly complex. Surrogates allow patrons to get involved in 
insurgency struggles, civil wars or rebellions while maintaining the legitimacy in the eyes of the 
local civilian population (Mansoor, 2012, p.9). Generating a desired effect indirectly through 
surrogates who are part of the local socio-political fabric, means that the patron can pursue his 
agenda potentially facilitated by the popular support for the surrogate. At the same time, 
legitimate bonds between the local population and the surrogate allows for a more effective 
achievement of strategic and operational objectives in a population-centric warfare environment. 
As the undeclared champion of surrogate warfare, Iran has a long record of both implanting and 
nurturing insurgent movements within the socio-political fabric of states within the wider Middle 
East. Since its foundation the Islamic Republic has relied on militias both internally and externally 
to effectively wage war against its pronounced enemies. These militias were not only trained and 
equipped to master guerrilla warfare but were embedded within wider humanitarian efforts to 
elevate disenfranchised communities from socio-political and socio-economic marginalization. In 
Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, Iran has been able to wage its own wars with considerable public 
support and legitimacy – doing so with a degree of plausible deniability (Deghhanpishe, 2014; 
Wiggintona, 2015, p.155; (Quaidari, 2015).  
The relationship of these variables to each other can be best illustrated in a formula where each 
variable is context dependent as well as relies on the subjective calculus of the actor committing 
to surrogate warfare:  
𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦
+ [(𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 &𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 )
− (𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 + ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛)]  
− [𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 − (𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)]
= 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑜 𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 
Conclusions 
The idea to externalize the burden of warfare appears atypical in the era of Westphalian 
statehood despite its historic precedents in pre-modern times. As a matter of fact, the pre-
Westphalian era exhibited many of the same characteristics of warfare that we identify in the 
surrogate wars of the 21st century. The fundamental change with the deputation of the state’s 
citizen soldier lies more substantially in the new socio-political context in which violence in the 
new millennium is being organized and executed. As Clausewitz argued already in his magnum 
opus ‘On War’: 
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“Very few of the new manifestations in war can be ascribed to new inventions or new 
departures in ideas. They result mainly from the transformation of society and new social 
conditions” (Clausewitz, 1940, p.515). 
It is the socio-political underpinnings of these new security assemblages between state and 
surrogate that bring with it fundamental transformations in the nature of warfare. The departure 
from trinitarian warfare creates hybrid non-trinitarian security assemblages, whereby the state 
remains as a mere primus inter pares. These assemblages might appear essentially pre-modern 
but are run by states. In that way, the modern state remains the primary communal security 
provider, manoeuvring through a complex globalized security context, where risk management 
takes precedence over threat mitigation; where non-state actors both challenge and supplement 
state capability; and where transnational communities clash over ideas and narratives in a global 
public sphere. 
As a socio-political phenomenon, surrogate warfare defines a non-trinitarian mode of war, which 
at first sight seems to provide the state with a silver bullet to solving the dilemma of having to 
cater for ever more communal security requirements, with less visibility and exposure to risk in 
the course of doing so. Defying public opinion at home, locally and in the global public sphere, 
surrogate warfare offers the state with a non-trinitarian means to engage in conflicts that are 
often removed from the consciousness and concerns of the state’s trinitarian principal, society, 
as well the global public.  
Yet, this alleged panacea for the state’s problem of shaping post-modern conflicts is not without 
negative consequences. Most of these are related to the principal-agent problem within the 
surrogate relationship, namely the loss of patron control amid a constant surrogate quest for 
more autonomy. The loss of control over its non-trinitarian agent can lead to surrogates 
overcharging and underperforming, often not achieving the patron’s intended outcomes, 
protracting conflicts, or abusing patron support for self-interested alternative agendas. 
Thus, surrogate warfare is probably not the panacea for fighting wars in the 21st century but it 
provides states with a relatively cheap and rapid way of fighting wars in the short-term. Since the 
scope of risks and conflicts in this century is not likely to recede, surrogate warfare is likely to 
become the new norm in 21st century warfare.  
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